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COMPARISON EVIDENCE IN 
OBSCENITY TRIALS 
Marguerite Munson Lentz* 
"[S]ex and obscenity are not synonomous":1 sexually explicit 
material is obscene only when it tends to incite shameful or lust-
ful thoughts and thus appeals to the prurient interest.2 A critical 
constitutional distinction exists between such obscene matter 
and portrayals of sex which do not appeal to the prurient inter-
est. While nonprurient sexual depictions enjoy full first amend-
ment freedoms, 8 the purveyor of obscene material cannot claim 
the protections of the first amendment;' and indeed may be sub-
ject to state or federal prosecution for violating obscenity 
statutes.15 
• Associate, Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn, Detroit, Michigan. B.A., 1976, J.D. 
1979, University of Michigan. I wish to thank Judge Cornelia G. Kennedy, and Profes-
sors Carl E. Schneider and Richard Lempert of the University of Michigan Law School 
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). 
2. See id. at 485, 486-87 & n.20; State v. Bartanen, 121 Ariz. 454, 458-60, 591 P.2d 
546, 550-52, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Ob-
scenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 49 (1960). 
3. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 488. 
4. Id. at 486-87. 
5. While possession of obscenity in the home is constitutionally protected, see Stan-
ley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1968), the seller or distributor of obscenity may be prose-
cuted. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973) (citing Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. at 484-85). Federal statutes prohibit the mailing or carrying through interstate 
commerce of obscene materials, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462 (1976), or the importation of 
obscene materials, see 19 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West Supp. 1981). 
Most jurisdictions prohibit the sale or distribution of obscene materials. See Au. 
CooE §§ 13-7-162, -191 (1975); ARlz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3502 (1978); .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 
41-3553 (1977); CAL. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 311.2 (West 1970); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-7-103 
(1978) (but see People v. New Horizons, Inc., 616 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1980) (Colorado stat-
ute is unconstitutionally overbroad)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-194 (1972); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1361 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-200l(a)(l) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 847.07 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 712-1214 (1976); 
IDAHO CoDE § 18-4103 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20 (Smith-Hurd 1979); IND. 
CoDE § 35-30-10.1-2 (Supp. 1979); lowA CODE ANN. § 728.4 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-4301 (Supp. 1979); Kv. REv. STAT. §§ 531.030, .060 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14:106.A.(3) (West Supp. 1980); MD. CRIM. LAw CODE ANN. § 418 (Supp. 1981); MAss. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29 (Michie/Law Co-op 1980); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.343a (1970); 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 617.241 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 97-29-39 (1972); Mo. 
ANN. STAT. §§ 573.020-.030 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-813 (1978); NEV. REv. 
STAT. § 201.249 (1978); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 650.2 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:34-2 (West Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-2 (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 
45 
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The Supreme Court, in Miller v. California, 8 fashioned a 
three-part obscenity test which reflects this distinction.7 A work 
235.05-.06 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-27.1-01 (1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (Page 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21, § 1040.13 (West Supp. 1980-1981); Oa. REV. STAT. § 167.087 (1979); PA. CoNs. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 5903 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4074 (Supp. 
1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-1 (Supp. 1980) (but see D & J. Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Michaelson, 401 A.2d 440 (R.I. 1979) (Rhode Island statute is unconstitutionally over-
broad)); S.C. CODE § 16-15-320 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3004 (Supp. 1981); 
Tux. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 43.23 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-
10-1204 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802 (1974); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1024 
(Supp. 1979); VA. CODE§ 18.2-374 (1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 9.68.060 (1977); Wis. 
STAT. ANN. § 944.21(1)(a) (West 1958); WYO. STAT. § 6-5-304 (1977). Three states pro-
hibit the sale or distribution of obscene materials to minors, but have no restrictions for 
adults. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2911 (Supp. 1981-1982); Mom. CODE ANN.§ 
45-8-20l(l)(a) (1979); W. VA. CODE§ 61-8A-2 (1977). South Dakota prohibits the sale or 
distribution of obscene materials to minors, S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 22-24-28 (1979), but 
explicitly permits such sales to adults, id. § 22-24-36. Alaska has no restrictions on the 
sale or distribution of obscene materials. 
6. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
7. Id. at 24. For discussion about the development and substance of obscenity law, 
see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 831-47 
(1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-16 (1978). 
The Miller test reformulates earlier standards having their roots in Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), which were promulgated by a plurality of the Court in 
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Under the Roth-Memoirs test, sexually 
explicit material would be obscene if: "(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a 
whole appeal[edJ to the prurient interest in sex; (b) the material was patently offensive 
because it affront[ed] contemporary community standards relating to the description of 
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material [was) utterly without redeeming 
social value." Id. at 418. Many lower courts, with later approval from the Supreme 
Court, see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977), relied upon the Roth-
Memoirs test. See, e.g., United States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1976); Huffman 
v. United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearing, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 455 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 913 
(1973); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. 
App. 202, 273 A.2d 436 (1971); State v. Blair, 32 Ohio St. 2d 237,291 N.E.2d 451 (1972), 
vacated, 413 U.S. 905 (1973). 
Miller departed most significantly from the Roth-Memoirs formulation by relaxing the 
requirement that obscene material be "utterly without redeeming social value." Yet the 
same three basic elements of prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, and l~ck of social 
value must be present under either test for the material to be obscene, and both Miller 
and Roth-Memoirs require that contemporary community standards provide the ulti-
mate rule of decision. See Benjoya, Zisson & LaCroix, Obscenity: The New Law and Its 
Enforcement-Two Views, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1, 2 (1973); Shugrue & Zeig, An Atlas 
for Obscenity: Exploring Community Standards, 7 CREIGHTON L. REv. 157, 176 (1973-
1974). Thus, any discussion of the admissability of comparison evidence in cases using 
the Roth-Memoirs standards, see, e.g., United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.), 
vacated, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. App. 202, 273 A.2d 436 (1971), is 
applicable to later cases applying the Miller test. Furthermore, the Miller standards ap-
ply to federal as well as state obscenity prosecutions, see United States v. 12 200-Ft. 
Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 (1973); thus this Article draws upon cases dealing with 
both federal and state obscenity statutes. 
Persons indicted for conduct occurring before Miller are entitled to all the benefits 
which Miller might confer, as well as the application ofthe Roth-Memoirs "utterly with-
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will be adjudged obscene only if it (1) appeals to the prurient 
interest of the average person applying contemporary commu-
nity standards,8 (2) is a patently offensive depiction of sexual 
conduct which has been proscribed by statute, and (3) is devoid 
of any serious social value.9 The concept of "community stan-
out redeeming value" standard. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1977); 
United States v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210, 212 (6th Cir. 1979). See generally Project, An 
Empirical Inquiry into the Effects of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscenity, 
52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 810, 825-57 (1977) (discussing the history of the Supreme Court deci-
sions from Roth to Miller). 
Not every court would agree that a prurient, patently offensive work should be consid-
ered nonobscene merely because socially valuable. In Salt Lake City v. Piepenburg, 571 
P.2d 1299 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court pressed the point with particular zeal: 
It would appear that [the] argument [that a work must lack serious social value 
to be obscene] ought only to be advanced by depraved, mentally deficient, mind-
warped queers. Judges who seek to find technical excuses to permit such pic-
tures to be shown under the pretense of finding some intrinsic value to it are 
reminiscent of a dog that returns to his vomit in search of some morsel in the 
filth which may have some redeeming value to his own taste. 
Id. at 1299-300. 
8. Prurient appeal is measured by the impact on the average adult rather than on a 
child, cf. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1978)(error to instruct that chil-
dren are part of the relevant community if no evidence is in the record that material was 
intended for children or that defendant believed children would likely receive the mate-
rial), or on a person particularly sensitive or insensitive to prurient appeal, provided the 
material is directed to the public at large. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973). 
But the jury properly may consider the sensitive along with the insensitive in assessing 
prurient interest. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. at 298-300. 
li sexually explicit material is directed at a special group rather than the public at 
large, the appeal to the prurient interest of a member of that group rather than of the 
average adult will be the relevant standard for determining obscenity. See Mishkin v. 
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1966); United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 
350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. App. 202, 216, 273 A.2d 436, 445 
(1971); State v. Von Cleef, 102 N.J. Super.·102, 120, 245 A.2d 495, 505 (1968), reu'd on 
other grounds, 395 U.S. 814 (1969). Materials which may be obscene if directed to the 
public at large may not be obscene if directed to the medical community. See United 
States v. Nicholas, 97 F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1938); United States v. One Package, 86 
F.2d 737, 738 (2d Cir. 1936); Davis v. United States, 62 F.2d 473, 474 (6th Cir. 1933); 
Commonwealth v. Landis, 8 Phila. 453, 454-55 (Phila. Pa. Quart. Sess. 1870). See also 
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 2 (arguing for a variable concept of obscenity depen-
dent upon the appeal to and the effect upon the target audience). 
9. Sexually oriented work is not obscene unless all three elements of the Miller test 
are satisfied. An offensive work, even when appealing to the prurient interest, will none-
theless be constitutionally protected if socially valuable. See, e.g., United States v. Pal-
ladino, 475 F.2d 65, 71 (1st Cir.) (holding the work Anal and Oral Loue nonobscene 
because not utterly lacking in social value, even though the dominant theme was pruri-
ent and the work's discussion may have exceeded national standards in its offensiveness), 
vacated, 413 U.S. 916 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 233 
· A.2d 840 (1967) (reversing obscenity conviction for sale of Candy because the book had 
some social value), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968). · 
Likewise, an offensive work without social value that lacks appeal to the prurient in-
terest will not be obscene. See, e.g., United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 164-65 (2d Cir. 
1965); Penthouse lnt'l Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2284 (N.D. Ga. May 
15, 1981); People v. Biocic, 80 lli. App. 2d 65, 70, 224 N.E.2d 572, 575 (1967); Cohen, 
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dards" thus forms the heart of the obscenity test: these stan-
dards explicitly measure whether a work appeals to the prurient 
interest and implicitly define a work's offensiveness.10 A vital el-
ement, therefore, of a defense to obscenity charges would be a 
demonstration that the material at issue did not transgress con-
temporary community standards, in terms of both offensiveness 
and appeal to the prurient interest.11 
Consider the example of Larry Flynt, well-known publisher of 
Hustler and Chic magazines.12 Flynt, prosecuted in Atlanta for 
selling those magazines, was found guilty on eleven counts of 
distributing obscene materials.13 The prosecution presented its 
Obscenity Cases: Anatomy of a Winning Defense, 14 CruM. L. BULL. 225 (1978). 
Furthermore, a work, though a valueless piece appealing to the prurient interest, will 
not be obscene if not patently offensive. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 
(1974); Huffman v. United States, 502 F.2d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The "patently 
offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct [must be] specifically defined by the regulating state 
law, as written or construed." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973). See, e.g., State 
v. Tara Enterprises, Inc., 202 Neb. 260, 274 N.W.2d 875 (1979) (reversing obscenity con• 
viction because magazine content did not fall within definitions proscribed by statute). 
For an example of a state obscenity statute proscribing fewer sexually explicit depictions 
than may constitutionally be forbidden, see low A CODE ANN.§ 728.4 (West 1979) (forbid-
ding only the sale of material depicting sadomasochistic abuse, excretory functions, sex 
with children, or bestiality). 
In addition to the requirement that all three prongs of the Miller test be satisfied, 
prurient appeal and social value must be determined by considering the material as a 
whole rather than in isolated parts. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957); 
United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936). Parts condemned by an obscenity 
statute, however, are considered separately when wholly unrelated to the rest of the 
work. See, e.g., Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam) ("A quotation 
from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally redeem an otherwise ob-
scene publication .... "); United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.) (obscene 
photos were not redeemed by being bound together with unrelated textual material), 
vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. 392 Copies of Magazine 
"Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 498 (D. Md. 1966) (written portions termed "secondary" 
because unrelated to the offensive illustrations), aff'd, 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.), rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 
(1967). But see State v. Walden Book Co., 386 So. 2d 345 (La. 1980) (finding an issue of 
Penthouse magazine nonobscene because a number of articles had literary or social 
value, although dissent argued that the articles comprised only 67 pages and were totally 
unrelated to 96 pages of obscene materials}. 
10. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977). 
11. This may not be the only available line of defense. The defendant might also try 
to show that the material at issue has serious social value or that another element of the 
crime, such as scienter, see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-54 (1959), is lacking. If 
other avenues are foreclosed, however, the defendant will have no choice but to attempt 
to show that the material in question does not transgress contemporary community stan-
dards. See id. at 164-66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (evidence of community standards 
"goes to the very essence of the defense and therefore to the constitutional safeguards of 
due process"). 
12. Flynt claims a national readership of 12 to 15 million for his magazines. Associ-
ated Press Newswire Report, March 26, 1979. 
13. See Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, 672, stay of enforce· 
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case-in-chief merely by introducing into evidence eight copies of 
Hustler and three copies of Chic; no witnesses were called. 14 
Flynt's defense consisted in part of various attempts to demon-
strate that Hustler was not obscene by contemporary commu-
nity standards. As evidence of those standards, he proferred an 
opinion poll, sales records of Hustler, numerous comparison ex-
hibits bearing a "reasonable resemblance"115 to Hustler and Chic, 
and the testimony of an expert and a public librarian regarding 
sexually explicit material available in the area. The trial court, 
_however, rejected all these attempts to demonstrate that Flynt's 
magazines did not transgress contemporary community stan-
dards on obscenity.18 
Comparison evidence, such as the magazines similar to Hus- · 
tler and Chic assembled by Flynt, is "[o]ne of the most often 
attempted and most rarely successful methods of presenting evi-
dence of contemporary community standards."17 As the term 
suggests, comparison evidence is proferred for the jury to com-
ment denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980). Flynt received a suspended jail sentence and was fined 
$27,500. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1979, § 1, at 18, col. 3. 
14. Several expert witnesses were called by the State in rebuttal on the obscenity 
question. Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. at 232, 264 S.E.2d at 672. 
15. Id. at 239, 264 S.E.2d at 676. 
16. The Georgia Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction, did not rule that the 
proffered evidence of community standards never would be admissible, but held the trial 
court had not abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. Id. at 237-43, 264 S.E.2d at 
675-78. 
17. Id. at 249, 264 S.E.2d at 681 (Dean, C.J., concurring) (quoting F. SCHAUER, THE 
LAW OF OBSCENITY 133 (1976)); see Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125-27 (1974). 
In addition to comparison evidence, prevailing community standards could be demon-
strated through the use of surveys, expert testimony, or other means. See, e.g., id.; 
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Schauer, Obscenity and the Conflict of Laws, 
77 W. VA. L. REv. 377, 388 (1975). 
This Article will not address the use of experts or surveys in obscenity trials. For a 
discussion of the problems involved in using experts, see Brigman, The Controversial 
Role of the Expert in Obscenity Litigation, 7 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 519 (1978); Frank, Ob-
scenity: Some Problems of Values and the Use of Experts, 41 WASH. L. REv. 631 (1966); 
McGaffey, A Realistic Look at Expert Witnesses in Obscenity Cases, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 
218 (1974); Stem, Toward a Rationale for the Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity 
Litigation, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 527 (1969); Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscen-
ity Cases, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1966); Note, The Use of Expert Testimony in Obscen-
ity Litigation, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 113. Survey evidence as a means for presenting commu-
nity standards in obscenity trials is assessed in Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. at 232-33, 
264 S.E.2d at 672; People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 196, 410 N.E.2d 476 (1980); Com-
monwealth v. Trainor, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 1220-22 (Mass. 1978); Brigman, supra, at 544 
(suggesting properly executed survey evidence avoids the pitfalls of comparison evi-
dence); Beckett & Bell, Community Standards: Admitting a Public Opinion Poll Into 
Euidence in an Obscenity Case, CASE & COMMENT, March-April 1979, at 18; Bell, Deter-
mining Community Standards, 63 A.B.A. J. 1202 (1977); Fahringer, The Defense of an 
Obscenity Prosecution, TmAL, May 1978, at 32; Lamont, Public Opinion Polls and Sur-
uey Evidence in Obscenity Cases, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 135 (1972-1973). 
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pare with the material directly at issue. For example, Flynt's at-
torney claimed that if the jurors had been permitted to view the 
proferred comparison exhibits, which sold 1.3 million copies in 
the county during the six-month period covered by Flynt's in-
dictments, they would have recognized that Hustler and Chic 
did not overstep contemporary community standards.18 
Flynt's inability to introduce comparison evidence is a com-
mon though not typical experience. Courts have varied markedly 
in their treatment of comparison evidence:19 some have admitted 
it;20 some have excluded it;21 some have reversed lower courts for 
18. See Harris, Publisher Larry Flynt Has a Tough Week in Atlanta Court, Wash-
ington Post, March 25, 1979, at A6, col. 1. The Georgia Court of Appeals found the 
excluded comparison evidence to be similar to the copies of Chic and Hustler at issue. 
Nonetheless, it upheld the trial court's exclusion of these .exhibits because Flynt's prof er-
red evidence 9f sales figures for the comparison exhibits was not the best evidence. Al-
though Flynt had shown that the comparison exhibits were distributed to 324 retail out-
lets in the county, the court found this demonstrated availability rather than the 
requisite community acceptance. Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. at 239-43, 264 S.E.2d at 
676-78. 
While obscenity defendants commonly make proffers of comparison evidence, prosecu-
tors might also wish to introduce comparison exhibits to illustrate sexually explicit mate-
rial considered obscene by the community. See, e.g., People v. Luros, 4 Cal. 2d 84, 86, 
480 P.2d 633, 634, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833, 834, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971); Lockhart & 
McClure, supra note 2, at 26 (Solicitor General in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S: 476 
(1957), presented the Court with a carton containing hard-core pornographic materials). 
. 19. See United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 374 (D.C. Cir.) ("There has been a 
considerable amount of confusion in the courts as to the admissibility and function of 
· comparison evidence in obscenity cases. Some jurisdictions have held it reversible error 
to reject such evidence, while others exclude it rather summarily."), cert. denied, 422 
U.S. 1022 (1974).. . 
20. See Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 
(1962); United States v. Oakley, 290 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 888 
(1961); United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1956), atf'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); 
United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353, 355 (N.D. Ill. 
1975); United States v. Gower, 316 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 (D.D.C. 1970), vacated and re• 
manded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 914 (1973); United States v. 392 Copies of Magazine 
"Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 495-96 (D. Md. 1966), atf'd, 373 F.2d 633 {4th Cir.), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 
(1967); United States v. Ginzburg, 224 F. Supp. 129, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1963), atf'd, 338 F.2d 
12 (3d Cir. 1964), atf'd, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 196, 199, 
410 N.E.2d 476, 479 (1980); People v. Brooklyn News Co., 12 Misc. 2d 768, 772-73, 174 
N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (1958); State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 105, 447 P.2d 304, 310-11 (1968), 
cert. d1_mied, 394 U.S. 931 (1969). 
21. See United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1974); United 
States v. Thevis, 490 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Van Gundy v. United 
States, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974); Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 403 (D.C. Cir. 
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Jacobs, 433 
F.2d 932, 933 {9th Cir. 1970); Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655, 659 {9th Cir. 1970), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 913 (1973); Books, Inc. v. United 
States, 358 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); 
Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U;S. 859 
(1961); Schindler v. United States, 208 F.2d 289, 290 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 
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refusing to admit it;22 some have suggested it never is admissi-
ble.23 Moreover, the courts' reasoning has been as disparate as 
their conclusions. A few courts have admitted comparison evi-
dence without discussion,u while many others have summarily 
excluded it.211 Some find comparison evidence relevant if freely 
available in the community,28 yet other courts have argued that 
U.S. 938 (1954); Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 482-83, 296 So. 2d 218, 226-27 (1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975); Matheny v. State, 55 Ala. App. 119, 123-24, 313 So. 2d 547, 
550 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 982 (1976); Dumas v. State, 131 Ga. App. 79, 81, 205 
S.E.2d 119, 121 (1974); State v. Carlson, 291 Minn. 368, 372-73, 192 N.W.2d 421, 424-25 
(1971); State v. Von Cleef, 102 N.J. Super. 102, 121, 245 A.2d 495, 506 (1968), rev'd on 
other grounds, 395 U.S. 814 (1969); State v. Blair, 32 Ohio St. 2d 237, 239-40, 291 N.E.2d 
451, 454 (1972), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 905 (1973); City of Sioux Falls v. 
Mini-Kota Art Theatres, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 676, 678-79 (S.D. 1976); State v. J-R Distribs., 
Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 644, 512 P.2d 1049, 1083 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949 (1974). 
22. See In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879,366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961); People v. 
Heller, 96 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 157 Cal. Rptr. 830, (1979); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. 
App. 202, 273 A.2d 436 (1971); Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962); State 
ex rel. Leis v. William S. Barton Co., 45 Ohio App. 2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 342 (1975); Berg 
v. State, 599 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980) (error to exclude some exhibits while al-
lowing other comparison exhibits to be admitted). 
23. See United States v. One Reel of 35mm. Color Motion Picture Film, 491 F.2d 
956, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Hochman, 175 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Wis. 1959), 
aff'd, 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); People v. Finkelstein, 11 
N.Y.2d 300, 183 N.E.2d 661 (1962); State v. Tidyman, 30 Ore. App. 537, 568 P.2d 666, 
(1977). One prosecutor has suggested that, as a practical matter, comparison evidence 
rarely will be admissible in an obscenity trial. See Cartolano, The Hustler Trial: Two 
Opinions on the Use of Comparative Evidence in Determining Community Standards 
in Obscenity Litigation: The Prosecution, 4 N. Kv. L. REV. 195 199-200 (1977). 
24. See Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 
(1962); United States v. Oakley, 290 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
888 (1961); United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1956), atf'd, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957); In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 566-67, 446 P.2d 535, 538, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658 
(1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969); People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 196, 410 
N.E.2d 476 (1980); People v. Brooklyn News Co., 12 N.Y. Misc. 2d 768, 174 N.Y.S. 813 
(1958) (admitted material already adjudicated nonobscene); State v. Horn, 18 N.C. App. 
377, 197 S.E.2d 274 (1973), atf'd, 285 N.C. 82, 203 S.E.2d 36, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 
(1974). . 
25. See United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1974); United 
States v. Thevis, 490 F.2d 7.6, 77 (5th Cir. 1974) ("If expert testimony is not required to 
determine obscenity, it is certainly within the trial judge's discretion not to allow compa-
rable evidence."), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 801 (1975); United States v. Jacobs, 433 F.2d 
932, 933 (9th Cir. 1970); Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 1970), va-
cated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 913 (1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1100 (9th 
Cir. 1974); Dumas v. State, 131 Ga. App. 79, 205 S.E.2d 119 (1974). 
26. See United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353 
(N.D. ID. 1975); In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961) (error 
to exclude either comparison evidence of materials already adjudicated nonobscene or 
comparable books and publications sold in community); Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 
229-30, 182 A.2d 798, 802 (1962) (error to exclude books on sale in the community that 
were proffered as comparison exhibits); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. App. 202, 220-21, 273 
A.2d 436, 447 (1971) (abuse of discretion to exclude, for comparison purposes, newspa-
pers and magazines circulating freely in the area). 
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mere availability of the exhibits has no relevance to assessing 
whether a particular work is obscene.27 Still other courts have 
found countervailing factors, such as the desire to avoid either 
cumulative evidence28 or jury confusion,29 sufficiently persuasive 
to justify excluding relevant comparison evidence. A more recent 
approach, based upon the formulation set forth in United States 
v. Womack,30 assesses the relevancy of comparison evidence 
based upon its similarity to the materials in question and its ac-
ceptability to the community.31 
27. See United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
947 (1971); Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1966) ("It is, of 
course, true that what is sold in the market reflects to some extent community stan-
dards. But it is not true that every item sold is necessarily not obscene. Hence, not every 
book in the market is admissible to test the obscenity of Lust Job."), rev'd on other 
grounds, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 860 
(6th Cir.) ("[T]he establishment of a fait accompli by the purveyors of pornography is 
[not] proof that they have already succeeded in destroying every remaining standard of 
our contemporary society. Nor has that society endowed these men with the right to 
establish our standards. License to continue does not follow each victory in spreading 
obscenity."), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 
U.S. 447 (1967); United States v. Hochman, 175 F. Supp. 881, 882 (immaterial to prose-
cution whether other persons were violating any laws, legal or moral, or were selling ob-
scene literature), aff'd, 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); Ma-
theny v. State, 313 So. 2d 547, 549-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 982 
(1976); State v. Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 647, 126 N.W.2d 858, 862-63 (1964) (other 
materials are not necessarily acceptable merely because not selected for prosecution); 
People v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 183 N.E.2d 661, 663-64, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 
(1962) (fact that publications were seen in bookstores does not indicate that the books 
were sold or read). But see State v. Short, 368 So. 2d 1078, 1082 (La.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 884 (1979) (that evidence of availability does not itself prove acceptability or toler-
ance is an argument addressed to the weight, not the admissibility, of such evidence). 
28. See United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 1966), 
rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); 
Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So. 2d 218 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975); 
People v. Heller, 96 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 157 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1979). 
29. See Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1966), rev'd per 
curiam on other grounds, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); State v. Henry, 250 La. 682, 702, 198 So. 
2d 889, 895-96 (1967), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); State v. 
Carlson, 291 Minn. 368, 373, 192 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1971); State v. Von Cleef, 102 N.J. 
Super. 102, 121-22, 245 A.2d 495, 506 (1968) (introducing materials already adjudicated 
nonobscene would make trial unmanageably complex), rev'd per curiam on other 
grounds, 395 U.S. 814 (1969). See generally I J. WmMORE, EvlDENCE IN TRIALS AT COM-
MON LAW § 29a (3d ed. 1940); Cady, Objections to Demonstrative Evidence, 32 Mo. L. 
REV. 333, 344 (1967). 
30. 509 F.2d 368, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 859 (1961)), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975). 
31. See United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd and re-
manded on other grounds, 436 U.S. 293, on remand, 579 F.2d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 439 U.S. 999 (1978); United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971); Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 403-04 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Ja-
cobs, 433 F.2d 932, 933 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Gower, 316 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 
(D.D.C. 1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 914 (1973); United 
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Although the Supreme Court has not gone so far as to find 
comparison evidence never admissible, in Hamling v. United 
States32 it approved various arguments commonly cited as ratio-
nales for excluding comparison evidence. In Hamling, the trial 
court had rejected defendant's proffer of two types of compari-
son evidence: material that had been found constitutionally pro-
tected speech in previous litigation, and material openly availa-
ble at newsstands.33 The Court found no abuse of discretion in 
the exclusion of either type of evidence - the comparison ex-
hibits were not necessarily relevant merely because readily avail-
able or previously adjudicated nonobscene. Even assuming the 
relevance of the exhibits, however, the Court found their exclu-
sion to be justified by the possibly confusing effects upon the 
jury. Furthermore, the Court argued that any error in the exclu-
sion of comparison evidence was rendered harmless by the op-
portunity to present expert evidence regarding prevailing com-
munity standards. 34 
This Article critiques the approach endorsed in Hamling, par-
ticularly regarding the Court's failure to consider how the pre-
sentation of proof in an obscenity trial affects the defendant's 
constitutional rights. The Article urges that relevant comparison 
evidence should be admissible despite the risk of confusion or 
States v. 392 Copies of Magazine "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 495 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd, 
373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds su.b nom. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 
171, 195-99 (W.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855,860 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam 
on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Pierce v. State, 
292 Ala. 473, 483, 296 So. 2d 218, 227 (1974) (evidence on community standards must be 
admitted upon establishment of a proper foundation); Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 
235-37, 264 S.E.2d 669, 674, stay of enforcement denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980); State v. 
Carlson, 291 Minn. 368, 373, 192 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1971); City of Sioux Falls v. Mini-
Kota Art Theatres, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 676, 679 (S.D. 1976); State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 
Wash. 2d 584, 647, 512 P.2d 1049, 1083 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 947 (1974). 
32. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). With the exception of Hamling, the Supreme Court has not 
considered directly the extent to which evidence may be admitted or excluded in an 
obscenity trial. The issue was raised in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), but the 
majority declined to address the question - although Justices Frankfurter and Harlan 
would have ruled it error to exclude all proffered evidence of community standards. Id. 
at 164-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 171-72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Similarly, in Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 304-05 (1978), 
the Court remanded to the Court of Appeals the question of admissibility of comparison 
evidence. See United States v. Pinkus, 579 F.2d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir.) (applying the Wo-
mack test for admissibility on remand), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 999 (1978). 
33. The defendant in Hamling also proffered as evidence of community standards 
materials which had received second-class mailing privileges. The Court rejected this 
proffer, however, reasoning that the receipt of special mailing privileges had no bearing 
on determining community standards because postal inspectors have no power of censor-
ship. See 418 U.S. at 126. 
34. Id. at 124-27. 
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the opportunity to present expert testimony, and furthermore, 
that a court should be required to make explicit its findings re-
garding the relevancy of comparison evidence. Part I of the Arti-
cle demonstrates the constitutional significance to the obscenity 
defendant of evidence, particularly comparison exhibits, bearing 
on prevailing community standards. Part II considers the assess-
ment of the relevancy of comparison evidence and the need for 
written evaluation from a trial court excluding comparison evi-
dence as irrelevant. Finally, part III argues that countervailing 
factors normally should not be considered sufficiently weighty to 
justify exclusion of relevant comparison evidence. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPARISON EVIDENCE TO PROTECTING 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE OBSCENITY DEFENDANT 
A. Community Standards and Due Process 
Due process requires that a defendant be presumed innocent 
unless the prosecution has proved every element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 311 In an obscenity prosecution, there-
35. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 
501, 503 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
Three different burdens of proof are present in any criminal jury trial: (1) the burden 
of pleading the issue; (2) the burden of producing evidence on the issue; and (3) the 
burden of persuading the jury. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and 
Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 171-73 
(1969). While the burden of pleading is a mere formality, id. at 172, the burden of pro-
duction requires a party to come forward with evidence sufficient to support a finding on 
a particular issue. If the party having the burden of production fails to produce sufficient 
evidence, the court takes the issue from the jury and rules against that party. Under-
wood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases; 
86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1300 n.3 (1977). In the obscenity case, neither party has the burden 
- other than that placed upon the prosecution to introduce the allegedly obscene mater-
ials into evidence - to produce evidence regarding the three elements of the Miller 
obscenity test. The jury may decide questions of prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, or 
social value without benefit of any evidence other than the material at issue. See, e.g., 
United States v. Davis, 353 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 953 
(1966); notes 38-42 and accompanying text infra. Thus, in an obscenity trial, the only 
important burden of proof is that of persuasion: the burden of convincing the jury to the 
required degree of certainty. 
For a brief historical background of the presumption of innocence, see Thaler, Punish-
ing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior 
To Trial, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 441, 459-65. 
This Article will not consider whether the definition of obscenity denies due process by 
being unconstitutionally vague, except insofar as the difficulties in admitting comparison 
evidence suggest community standards to be an unworkable concept. See pt. III infra. 
The Supreme Court has held the definition of obscenity not to be unconstitutionally 
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fore, the material at issue must be shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt to satisfy all three prongs of the Miller test;38 a defendant 
cannot be convicted on obscenity charges if the jury has reasona-
ble doubt whether the work in question transgresses contempo-
rary community standards.37 The Supreme Court held in Ham-
ling v. United States,36 however, that the prosecution in an 
obscenity case need not introduce evidence other than the mate-
rial in question to prove a violation of community standards.39 
vague in various contexts. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977) (Illinois obscenity 
statute); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977) (federal obscenity statute). But see 
Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 777-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marks v. United States, 430 
U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. 
Carter, 388 So. 2d 802, 803-04 (La. 1980) (statute prohibiting lewd dancing or pictures is 
unconstitutionally vague under Miller standards). For a discussion on the vagueness of 
the obscenity standard, see Gelhorn, Dirty Books, Disgusting Pictures, and Dreadful 
Laws, 8 GA. L. REV. 291 (1974); Comment, Community Standards in Obscenity Adjudi-
cation, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1277, 1288-90 (1978) (Supreme Court's specificity requirement 
satisfies first amendment and due process); Case Comment, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 391, 
400-03 (1976). 
36. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra. 
37. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra. 
38. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 
39. Id. at 100; see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973); United 
States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); 
United States v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir.) ("[t]he government may rely 
upon inferences [from the allegedly -obscene material placed in evidence] to support a 
finding of obscenity"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975); United States v. Groner, 479 
F.2d 577, 584 (5th Cir.) ("[t]he pictures, books, publications or other materials involved 
may serve as evidence to contradict the opinion of the expert"), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. Davis, 353 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir. 
1965) ("[t]he jury had before it only the labels, the advertisements, the phonograph 
records and record jackets" which were the subject of the obscenity prosecution), cert. 
denied, 384 U.S. 953 (1966). The jury's finding of obscenity is a permissible inference 
rather than a presumption. See, e.g., United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 585 (5th 
Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973). But see Ashford & 
Risinger, supra note 35, at 201 (jurors are strongly disposed to find inferences asserted 
by the prosecution, thus making a permissible inference equivalent to a presumption). 
The Supreme Court has reserved judgment as to whether expert testimony would be 
required where contested materials are directed at a bizarre deviant group whose tastes 
are outside the jury's experience. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 303 (1978); 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973). Two lower courts have sug-
gested that expert evidence should be introduced, even though not generally necessary, 
when the material is too "esoteric" for the jury. See United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 
166 (2d Cir. 1965) ("What stirs the lust of the sexual deviate requires evidence of special 
competence.") (quoting Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534, 539 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd 
per curiam, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.), vacated, 357 U.S. 346 (1958)); United States v. 392 
Copies of Magazine "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 493 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 633 
(4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); cf. People v. Wiener, 91 Cal. App. 3d 238, 244, 154 Cal. Rptr. 
110, 113 (1979) (court would not require expert evidence for materials dealing with 
pedophilia or bestiality because there was no demonstration that the materials were 
aimed at deviant groups); Gotlieb v. State, 406 A.2d 270, 278 (Del. Super. 1979) (the 
materials at issue were "not so unusually bizarre or arcane as to transcend the realm of 
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Rather, the prosecution could proffer only the putatively ob-
scene material;'0 leaving the jury to apply the Miller test based 
upon its own knowledge of prevailing standards in the commu-
nity. 41 The Court assumed that the jury, being competent to de-
termine the course followed by the "reasonable man,"42 likewise 
could gauge the content of prevailing community standards. In 
making this assumption, the Court appears to have entrusted 
the jury with a Herculean task. 
Contrary to the Court's reasoning, the nature of the inquiry 
into community standards differs fundamentally from questions 
involving the reasonable man. While questions of reasonableness 
and community norms both draw upon objective standards 
rather than jurors' subjective beliefs, reasonable man principles 
are based upon abstract, idealistic notions, while community 
standards are gleaned from concrete attitudes of specific people. 
The reasonable man standard does not depend upon what peo-
ple actually think or do; people do not necessarily think or act 
reasonably.43 Community standards, in contrast, are considered 
tangible criteria dependent upon actual views held by specific 
people - including the "sensitive and the insensitive" - so to 
reflect "the collective view" of everyone in the community."" Un-
less a consensus exists regarding community acceptance of sexu-
the jury's experience"). 
40. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973) ("Simply stated, 
hard core pornography ... can and does speak for itself.") (quoting United States v. 
Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971)); Flynt v. State, 
153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, stay of enforcement denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980). 
41. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974) ("A juror is entitled to 
draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or 
vicinage from which he comes for making the required determination •••. "). Various 
courts have perceived the jury as the embodiment of the community, thus obviating the 
need for any independent evidence regarding the views of that community. See, e.g., 
United States v. A Motion Picture Film, 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. 
West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 184 (W.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th 
Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 
447 (1967); People v. Better, 33 Ill. App. 3d 58, 66, 337 N.E.2d 272, 278 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 559, 62 N.E.2d 840, 848-49 (1945); City of Duluth v. 
State, 283 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979). 
42. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 30 (1973). 
43. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 151 (4th ed. 1971) 
("The courts have gone to unusual pains to emphasize the abstract and hypothetical 
character of this mythical [reasonable] person. He is not to be identified with any ordi-
nary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a prudent and 
careful man, who is always up to standard."). 
44. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 300 (1978) ("the community includes all 
adults who constitute it, and a jury can consider them all in determining relevant com-
munity standards"). 
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ally oriented material - a highly unlikely prospect"5 - the jury 
cannot know community standards without knowing the views 
held by all members of the community."8 Considering that the 
relevant community may be boundless, or as far-ranging as an 
entire state, this task borders on the impossible unless specific 
evidence is introduced to reflect those standards."7 
45. Several studies and commentators reject the possibility for a community consen-
sus on obscenity. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 17, at 1205-06; Dennison, The Hustler Trial: 
Two Opinions on the Use of Comparative Evidence in Determining Community Stan-
dards in Obscenity Litigation: The Defense, 4 N. Kv. L. REv. 200, 221-22 (1977); Wal-
lace, Obscenity and Contemporary Community Standards: A Survey, J. Soc. ISSUES, 
Autumn 1973, at 53; Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Life-
styles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 591 (1977); Wilson & Abelson, Experience With and 
Attitudes Toward Explicit Sexual Materials, J. Soc. ISSUES, Autumn 1973, at 19. 
46. Furthermore, the jury would need to know the views of most members of the 
community even to determine if a consensus existed. 
47. The Supreme Court has rejected as too abstract a national "community" stan-
dard for measuring obscenity, but has declined to specify a smaller geographic unit as 
constituting the appropriate community for purposes of applying the Miller test. Thus 
the jury may apply contemporaneous community standards without any specified geo-
graphic boundary. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-05 (1974); Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974); United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20, 22 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975); State v. Schwartz, 199 Neb. 17, 255 N.W.2d 
859 (1977); Hunt v. State, 601 P.2d 464, 469 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979). 
Although the national standard indeed may be overly abstract, the concept of commu-
nity standards seemingly makes little sense unless the community's bounds are defined. 
But see United States v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d at 22 ("The geographical limits of the 
community need not be defined when dealing with 'the average person applying contem-
porary community standards'."). Therefore, specifying a geographic area as the relevant 
community is constitutionally permissible, though not constitutionally required. See 
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 303 (1977); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. at 157; 
City of Tacoma v. Duane, 15 Wash. App. 698, 552 P.2d 1068 (1976). Many jurisdictions 
have responded by specifying the state as the relevant community. See, e.g., Pierce v. 
State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So. 2d 218 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975); State v. 
Cimino, 33 Conn. Sup. 680, 366 A.2d 1168 (1976); Dumas v. State, 131 Ga. App. 79, 205 
S.E.2d 119 (1974); People v. Better, 33 Ill. App. 3d 58, 337 N.E.2d 272 (1975); United 
States Mfg. & Distrib. Corp. v. City of Great Falls, 169 Mont. 298, 546 P.2d 522 (1976). 
Others define the relevant standard by reference to local commQDities. See, e.g., United 
States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 188 
(1977); United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. 
Ill. 1975); People v. Austin, 76 Mich. App. 455, 257 N.W.2d 120 (1977); Parrish v. State, 
521 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utah 1978). 
For purposes of various federal statutes, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) (mailing obscene 
matter prohibited); 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1976) (interstate transport of obscene matter pro-
hibited); 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970) (importation of obscene matter prohibited), obscen-
ity is defined by local and not statewide community standards. See Smith v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 291, 306 (1977). Interstate transportation of obscene matter may be 
prosecuted under local standards at the place of departure, see, e.g., United States v. 
Hill, 473 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchan-
dise, 562 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1977) (obscenity of imported material determined by stan-
dards of place of entry, not ultimate destination), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931 (1978); 
United States v.· Mohney, 476 F. Supp. 421, 426 (D. Hawaii 1979), the place of destina-
tion, see, e.g., United States v. Linetsky, 533 P.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
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Furthermore, even assuming that jurors might have an accu-
rate perception of prevailing attitudes, their application of com-
munity standards may well be distorted. Justice Stevens has 
suggested that a juror viewing sexually explicit material will 
often react differently in the social context of a jury room than if 
the material were viewed in a purely private setting.48 
Without relevant evidence demonstrating prevailing commu-
nity standards, the jury cannot avoid making a personal reaction 
to sexually explicit material,49 thus contravening the constitu-
Slepicoff, 524 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Schauer, 
supra note 17; Waples & White, Choice of Community Standards in Federal Obscenity 
Proceedings: The Role of the Constitution and 'the Common Law, 64 VA. L. REv. 399 
(1978); Comment, Federal Obscenity Prosecutions; Dirty Dealing with the First Amend-
ment, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 720 (1978); Note, Postal Obscenity Prosecutions After 
Miller v. California: Mandatory Venue in the Federal District of Intended Receipt, 58 
B.U. L. REv. 79, 81 (1978), or possibly any place through which the material passes, see 
United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 591 (5th Cir.)(Thornberry, J., dissenting), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); cf. United States v. Johnson, 323 
U.S. 273, 274 (1944)(Congress may constitutionally make an act illegal in any federal 
district through which the offending article is transported); Comment, Multi-Venue and 
the Obscenity Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 416-18, 430-31 (1967)(obscenity as a 
continuing offense may be prosecuted in any area through which the material passed). 
But cf. Note, Postal Obscenity Prosecutions After Miller v. California: Mandatory 
Venue in the Federal District of Intended Receipt, supra, at 79 (federal statute should 
not be construed to permit such broad venue). 
In addition to the difficulties engendered because the community may be large or un-
defined, two other considerations demonstrate that the jury cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to have accurate knowledge of prevailing community standards on obscenity. See 
generally Brigman, supra note 17, at 539 (social science data demonstrate that neither 
jury nor grand jury are representative of the community); U.S. CoMM'N ON OBSCENITY 
AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT 354-57 (1970) (studies suggest that Americans tend to esti-
mate prevailing sexual attitudes as more restrictive than they are in fact, and that little 
consensus exists on what is offensive or prurient). First, jurors may well be ignorant of 
attitudes held by members of the opposite sex. Studies show that men and women differ 
in their experiences, attitudes, and views on the portrayal of sexual acts. See Wallace, 
supra note 45, at 64; Wilson & Abelson, supra note 45, at 28, 32. 
Second, jurors are likely to be ignorant of the scope of sexually explicit works available 
in the community. Prosecutors, by using preemptory challenges, can exclude most jurors 
familiar with relevant community standards on obscenity. Dennison, supra note 45, at 
222; cf. United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 565 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1977) (trial 
judge "had very limited experience in determining what was pornographic, (little profes-
sionally and none personally)"). 
48. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 315 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Brigman, supra note 17, at 542; Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, supra 
note 17, at 171-72. 
49. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 479 (1966)(Black, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 562 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 
1977) ("In reality, no judge or jury can be expected to determine 'community standards' 
• . . . The best that anyone can do is give his or her personal reaction to it."), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 931 (1978); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 1965); In 
re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 574, 446 P.2d 535, 543, 71 Cal. Rptr. 655, 663 (1968), cert. 
denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969); Fahringer, supra note 17, at 33; Shugrue & Zieg, supra note 
8, at 165; Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, supra note 17, at 176. 
FALL 1981] Comparison Evidence in Obscenity Trials 59 
tional requirement that there be an objective assessment of a 
work's relation to community norms. 110 The difficulty - nigh im-
possibility - of the jury's task cannot be eased simply by plac-
ing the materials at issue into evidence. Those materials them-
selves communicate nothing about the community's views; 
prevailing community standards necessarily are external to the 
materials at issue and must be discovered through other evi-
dence.111 Without such evidence of prevailing standards, courts 
should rule that a critical element of an obscenity prosecution -
proof that the material in question transgresses community 
standards regarding prurient interest and offensiveness - has 
not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. Community Standards and Compulsory Process 
The sixth amendment112 affords the defendant in an obscenity 
case the constitutional right to muster a defense and to present 
evidence relevant to that defense.113 Given the significance of 
community standards in determining obscenity/• evidence re-
garding those standards clearly will be relevant to the defend-
ant's case in an obscenity prosecution. Because the right to pro-
duce a defense will thus include the right to demonstrate 
prevailing community standards,115 the obscenity defendant has a 
sixth amendment right to introduce comparison evidence bear-
ing on those standards. 
hi Hamling v. United States,116 however, the Supreme Court 
dismissed as harmless any error arising from the exclusion of de-
fendant's comparison exhibits, endorsing the lower courts' con-
clusion that the defendant had been fully able to present a de-
50. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974). 
51. See United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 665 F.2d 666, 570 (9th Cir. 1977). 
52. The sixth amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
53. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 818-19 (1975); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972)(per curiam). 
54. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra. 
55. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-67 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
id. at 171-72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Brinkerhoff-
Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930)). 
56. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 
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fense through the' introduction of expert testimony regarding 
community standards.117 The Court's analysis, though, failed to 
recognize significant differences between the two types of evi-
dence; comparison evidence may be far more effective than ex-
pert testimony in demonstrating prevailing community stan-
dards. The Court itself has noted that experts commonly are 
inappropriate in obscenity cases, and indeed, often have made a 
"mockery out of the otherwise sound concept · of expert testi-
mony. "118 Moreover, one researcher has found that jurors are 
particularly likely to ignore the testimony of experts in obscen-
ity trials.119 
Comparison evidence offers a substantial advantage over any 
expert testimony: the comparison exhibits may be taken into the 
jury room for examination at greater length and in greater de-
tail. 80 Thus, the jury may draw its own conclusions from careful 
evaluation of the comparison evidence, rather than having to 
rely upon the testimony of an expert witness it may find incredi-
ble. If the right to fashion a defense to obscenity charges has 
real substance, that right should not be limited to permitting the 
obscenity defendant to use evidence which even the Court ac-
knowledges is likely to be ineffective. Channelling the obscenity 
defendant into the use of expert testimony rather than relevant 
comparison evidence may seriously hamper the proof of contem-
porary community standards, thus impinging upon the constitu-
tional right to present a defense. 81 
C. Community Standards and Free Speech 
Obscene materials may be prohibited, and its purveyors prose-
cuted, only because obscenity falls outside the protections of the 
first amendment.82 Nonobscene material, assuming it does not 
fall within another category of unprotected speech,83 enjoys the 
57. Id. at 127. 
58. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973); see Kehm v. United 
States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962); State v. Carl-
son, 291 Minn. 368, 372-73, 192 N.W.2d 421, 424-25 (1971). 
59. See McGafl'ey, supra note 17, at 221-32. 
60. See generally McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OP EvJDENCE § 217 (2d ed. E. 
Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]. 
61. See People v. Heller, 96 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6, 157 Cal. Rptr. 830, 833-34 
(1979); Dennison, supra note 45, at 220. 
62. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973); Roth v. United States, -354 U.S. 
476, 485-87 (1957); accord, Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974). 
63. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§12-8, at 602-08 (1978). 
One commentator argues that the Supreme Court's isolation of obscenity as unprotected 
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safeguards of two mechanisms devised by the Supreme Court to 
ensure effectuation of first amendment rights. The first mecha-
nism - the test for obscenity promulgated in Miller64 - em-
bodies the Court's intent that only hard-core pornography, as 
illustrated by various examples set forth in Miller, 811 would sat-
isfy the three-prong obscenity test and thus be beyond first 
amendment protection. 
The allocation of responsibility for determining obscenity pro-
vides the second means for protecting the first amendment 
rights of purveyors of sexually explicit material. Assessment of 
whether a particular work is obscene involves a factual determi-
nation by the jury as to whether the work meets the legal defini-
tion66 of obscenity set forth in Miller. In the general case, such 
factual findings by the jury are accorded conclusive effect by the 
trial and appellate courts if supported by substantial evidence. 67 
In contrast, because of the dangers of infringing upon the right 
to free speech, the jury verdict in an obscenity case is not given 
its usual conclusive effect.88 Rather, both the trial and appellate 
courts must make independent reviews of the evidence to deter-
mine, as a factual matter, if the material at issue satisfies the 
Miller test. 89 
speech is correct because hard-core pornography is not speech but conduct - a surro-
gate for sexual acts. See Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": 
An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979). 
64. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra. 
65. "Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory 
functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals," or of "ultimate sexual acts, normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). Though a 
later case held these examples to embody the constitutional limitations of hard-core por-
nography, see Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974), they are not meant to be an 
exhaustive list. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 773 (1977); Hamling v. United States, 
418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974). 
66. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 118 (1974). 
67. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 13.8 (2d ed. 1977); 5 MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 38.05, at nn.15-22 (2d ed. 1981). 
68. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974); United States v. Cutting, 538 
F.2d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. A 
Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1968); 
McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343,348 (Mo. 1975); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, 
supra note 8, at 847. 
69. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 
232 (1972)(per curiam); Penthouse Int'] Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1364 (5th Cir.), 
cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980). The plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan in 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964), suggests that the factual question whether a 
particular work is obscene necessarily creates a companion first amendment question. 
The power of appellate courts to consider matters of constitutional law de novo thus 
implies an ability to investigate related matters of fact. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15, 25 (1973). 
An unsettled question exists as to whether the appellate court must actually view the 
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Meaningful independent review of the jury's factual findings, 
however, cannot occur, especially at the appellate level, unless 
independent evidence has been introduced regarding prevailing 
community standards. The appellate court in an obscenity case 
often will be far removed from the relevant community and 
likely will have no ability to gauge community standards.70 If no 
evidence is admitted at trial bearing on the content of prevailing 
community standards, the record on appeal will be barren of any 
definition of community norms.71 This seemingly presents an in-
superable burden for the appellate court which must apply pre-
vailing community standards when it independently reviews the 
obscenity vel non of the material in question. The problem 
presents itself at the trial level as well: one frustrated federal 
district court found itself unable to adjudge material obscene 
when no independent evidence had been introduced as to pre-
vailing community standards.72 Although the Supreme Court has 
yet to require the admission of evidence on community stan-
material at issue to ensure that there is evidence sufficient to support the finding of 
obscenity. In United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d 164, 170-71 (6th Cir. 1978), for instance, 
the Sixth Circuit noted that actual viewing of the material at issue would not always be 
necessary in order for the court to make an independent review of the juey findings. 
While the Supreme Court has not expressly required the appellate court to view the 
material in question, see id. at 170-71 & n.6, such a requirement makes sense given the 
Court's decisions in the first amendment area. The Court observed that application of 
the Miller obscenity test would not abridge free speech rights because "the First Amend-
ment values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately 
protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of 
constitutional claims when necessary." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 25. The contours 
of this independent review had been hinted at in Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 231: "A 
reviewing court must, of necessity, look at the context of the material, as well as its 
content." A reviewing court in an obscenity case could hardly consider context and con-
tent, and review all the evidence, without viewing the material in question. 
Appellate courts unquestionably have the power to view the material in question when 
making an independent determination as to the obscenity of the work. See, e.g., Jenkins 
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (reversing the decision of the Georgia courts that the 
movie Carnal Knowledge was obscene); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 
(5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980); United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835, 
840 {9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Womack, 509 
F.2d 368, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975); United States v. Hill, 
500 F.2d 733, 738 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975); United States v. A 
Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1968); 
United States v. Kaehler, 353 F. Supp. 476, 477 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
70. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 n.* (1977)(Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
71. See, e.g., United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 (2d 
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971). 
72. See United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 565 F.2d 566, 569, 571 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
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dards, 73 lower courts should recognize that the additional layer 
of factual review provided in obscenity cases becomes a hollow 
means for safeguarding first amendment rights unless the record 
contains independent evidence regarding prevailing community 
norms on obscenity. 
II. ASSESSING THE RELEVANCY OF COMPARISON EVIDENCE 
Comparison evidence proffered by the defendant purports to 
demonstrate that the material in question does not transgress 
community standards on sexual explicitness. Such evidence will 
be relevant7" and thus admissible75 whenever it bears upon de-
termining whether the work at issue satisfies either of two fac-
tual prongs of the Miller test.78 First, the comparison evidence 
could tend to disprove the obscenity of the material in question 
by showing that works like those at issue did not appeal to the 
prurient interest of the average person applying contemporary 
community standards.n Second, the. proffered comparison evi-
dence might indicate that the putatively obscene material, 
though perhaps having appeal to the prurient interest, was ac-
ceptable rather than offensive to the community. 
Implicit in either theory of the proffer of comparison evidence 
are the two foundation requirements for relevancy articulated in 
United States v. Womack.78 In order for comparison exhibits to 
73. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 & n.6 (1973). 
74. Relevancy is established whenever the proposition to be proved is more, or less, 
probable with than without the proffered evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (relevancy 
defined as "any tendency to make the existence of •.. the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence"); McCORMICK, supra note 60, § 185, at 
437; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, at § 32. Evidence need not by itself be dispositive of a 
given iss~e in order to be relevant. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN AP-
PROACH TO EvmENCE 140-41 (1977); 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, at §§ 28, 29, 32. 
75. Evidence is admissible at trial only when relevant to an issue having legal signifi-
cance. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402; R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 74, at 140-41; 
1 J. W1GMORE, supra note 29, at § 12. 
76. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra. 
77. Such a demonstration would be relevant because material cannot be obscene un-
less it ~ppeals to the prurient interest. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 
(1957); notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra. 
78. 509 F.2d 368, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975); see cases 
cited notes 30-31 supra. 
The Womack court, in formulating its two-part relevancy test, distinguished the prof-
fer of comparison evidence intended to demonstrate prevailing community standards 
from the introduction of comparison exhibits either (1) to impeach a witness or (2) to 
prove nonobscenity as a matter of law. See 509 F.2d at 374-82; Dennison, supra note 45, 
at 212-13. This Article similarly limits its analysis to considering the proffer of compari-
son evidence as a means for showing contemporary community standards on obscenity. 
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be considered relevant and therefore admissible, Womack re-
For instances where courts have allowed comparison evidence to be introduced on 
cross-examination for impeachDient purposes, see Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 
386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Matheny v. 
State, 55 Ala. App. 119, 313 So. 2d 547 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 982 (1976). Some 
courts, however, have not allowed the use of comparison evidence on cross-examination. 
See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d at 380; State v. Henry, 250 La. 682, 198 So. 
2d 889 (1967), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); State v. Blair, 32 
Ohio St. 2d 237, 291 N.E.2d 451 (1972), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 905 (1973). 
Because impeachment necessarily raises issues collateral to the trial, greater dangers of 
conr.JSion or undue delay arise when comparison evidence is used to impeach rather than 
to demonstrate community standards. Therefore, while the risk of confusion cannot jus-
tify the exclusion of comparison exhibits bearing upon contemporary community stan-
dards, see pt. ill infra, the use of comparison evidence for impeachment purposes should 
be left to the discretion of the trial judge. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, at 
§ 464. 
Where the obscenity defendant seeks to use comparison exhibits to demonstrate non-
obscenity as a matter of law, there will be a proffer of material previously adjudicated 
nonobscene. The Womack court noted that the trial judge properly could enter a judg-
ment of acquittal - either on a motion to dismiss or a motion for acquittal - if the 
material previously found nonobscene "equal[led] or exceed[ed]" the the sexual content 
of works at issue. 509 F.2d at 374. 
Obscenity becomes a question for the jury only when the judge finds the material to be 
a patently offensive "hard core" portrayal of explicit sexual conduct, see note 65 supra, 
proscribed by state law. E.g., NGC Theatre Corp. v. Mummert, 107 Ariz. 484, 488-90, 489 
P.2d 823, 828-29 (1971). Should the judge not find the material "hard core," the Miller 
court made clear that the first amendment demands dismissal of the prosecution without 
a full trial on the merits. See People v. Biocic, 80 m. App. 2d 65, 69, 224 N.E.2d 572, 575 
(1967); People v. Austin, 76 Mich. App. 455, 463, 257 N.W.2d 120, 124 (1977). But see 
United States .v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210, 213 n.6 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 
(1979): 
"[R]arely is it argued with any force that the material in question is as a matter 
of law not obscene, and that claim is not made here. One reason for this, we 
suspect, is that where material has any remote relation to the values protected 
by the obscenity tests, a generally tolerant society tolerates it in all events. A 
second, more important reason, we suspect, is that the commercial marketability 
of obscene materials depends in major part upon the very absence of those qual-
ities which lift that material into the area of First Amendment protection." 
In a civil proceeding where obscenity may be proved by a mere preponderance of the 
evidence rather than by the reasonable doubt standard, the court may be less willing to 
rule in the defendant's favor on the obscenity issue. See Dunn v. Maryland State Bd. of 
Censors, 240 Md. 249, 254-56, 213 A.2d 751, 754-55 (1965)(in a civil proceeding denying a 
license, judge cannot rule materials are nonobscene as a matter of law where the obscen-
ity vel non is a disputed fact). 
Although the court may rule that the defendant's material is nonobscene as a matter 
of law, it never may find material obscene as a matter of law. To allow the court to 
determine obscenity as a matter of law would be to deprive the defendant of confronta-
tion and jury trial rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment. See Hirsch & Ryan, I 
Know It When I Seize It: Selected Problems in Obscenity, 4 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 9, 79-80 
(1971). 
Many cases have considered prior adjudicated material on a motion to dismiss or a 
motion to acquit. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); United States v. 
Palladino, 475 F.2d 65, 70-71 (1st Cir.}, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 
U.S. 916 (1973}; United States v. Hill, 473 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1972}; Huffman v. United 
States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 
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quires a threshold demonstration that the proffered evidence be 
(1) similar to the material in question, and (2) acceptable to the 
community.79 Without proof of similarity, the comparison evi-
dence is not relevant to assessing whether the material at issue 
offends contemporary community standards; without proof of 
acceptability, the comparison exhibits are no more illustrative of 
prevailing community attitudes toward sexually explicit materi-
als than is the material in question. 
While the Womack test for admissibility of comparison evi-
dence appears clear on its face, application of the test has not 
been easy. The concepts of similarity and acceptability were left 
undefined in Womack and have entrusted considerable discre-
tion in courts wrestling with the standards.80 Undefined stan-
dards for determining the relevancy of comparison exhibits, 
though, present significant constitutional dangers. If the Wo-
mack test vests unbridled discretion in the trial court to pass on 
the admissibility of comparison exhibits, evidentiary protections 
for the due process and free speech rights of the obscenity de-
fendant81 may be seriously compromised. Moreover, uncertainty 
regarding the admissibility of comparison evidence creates 
problems for the distributor of sexually explicit material who 
will have trouble measuring what lies beyond prevailing commu-
nity standards without knowing what illustrates those standards. 
This raises the danger that constitutionally protected speech 
will be chilled in order to avoid the uncertain risks of crimnal 
1974); United States v. 392 Copies of Magazine "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 495 (D. 
Md. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Central Maga-
zine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 105, 
447 P.2d 304, 311 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 931, rev'd an writ of habeas carpus, 300 
F. Supp. 650 (D. Or. 1969). Other courts have taken judicial notice of prior adjudications 
to find obscenity defendants not guilty. See, e.g., United States v. Boltansky, 346 F. 
Supp. 272, 276 (D. Md. 1972); Commonwealth v. LaLonde, 447 Pa. 364, 368-69, 288 A.2d 
782, 784-85 (1972). For an example of an appellate court reversing a conviction due to 
the existence of comparable materials already adjudicated nonobscene by the Supreme 
Court, see Pinkus v. Pitchess, 429 F.2d 416, 417 (9th Cir.), aff'd mem. by an equally 
divided court sub nam. California v. Pinkus, 400 U.S. 922 (1970). 
79. . 509 F.2d at 377. 
80. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 99 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (the Miller test "apparently requires an effort to distinguish between 'singles' and 
'duals,' between 'erect penises' and 'semi-erect penises,' and between 'ongoing sexual ac-
tivity' and 'imminent sexual activity'"); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1959) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. Pinkus, 579 F.2d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir.) (the 
admissibility of comparison evidence "is a difficult area and the standards are ill de-
fined"), cert. dismissed, 43~ U.S. 999 (1978); Dennison, supra note 45, at 216. 
The courts also must often undertake the difficult task of defining the geographic 
boundaries of the community. See note 47 supra. 
81. See pt. I supra. 
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liability. 82 As the following sections demonstrate, very few con-
crete standards can be derived from the courts' approaches to 
assessing the similarity and acceptability of comparison 
evidence. 
A. The Acceptability of Comparison Evidence 
Acceptability is not a self-defining concept; it could mean any-
thing on a continuum from whole-hearted community approval 
to indifferent toleration. At the very least, however, a commu-
nity will be deemed not to accept material defined as obscene by 
Miller; the test reflects at its core local community feelings re-
garding sexually explicit material.83 Thus, as a, threshold matter, 
comparison exhibits cannot be considered acceptable if obscene 
under the Miller test. 
Beyond this threshold determination, though, the means for 
demonsti:ating acceptability become muddled. Defendants mak-
ing a proffer of comparison exhibits commonly will argue either 
(1) that the exhibits previously were adjudicated nonobscene 
and so must be acceptable, or (2) that the exhibits are accept-
able because widely available in the community.84 
1. Comparison evidence previously adjudicated nonob-
scenesis_ Comparison exhibits which previously were the subject 
of an obscenity prosecution resulting in acquittal will not always 
be relevant to assessing the obscenity of other materials.88 Even 
assuming the similarity of the comparison evidence to the mate-
rial at issue, 87 the previous acquittal involving such evidence 
does not necessarily show the extent of community acceptance 
of sexually explicit material. The prior adjudication involving 
the comparison exhibits, for instance, might have resulted in ac-
quittal not because the exhibits were constitutionally protected 
speech under the Miller test, but because other vital elements of 
82. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). 
83. Protection of the quality of life and the total environment of the community con-
stitutes a legitimate state justification for prohibiting obscenity. See Paris Adult Theatre 
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973). . 
84. See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 373 n.6, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975). 
85. This section discusses the question of when material previously found nonobscene 
may be given to the jury as evidence of community acceptability. A related issue -
whether materials already adjudicated nonobscene can be used to take the case from the 
jury - is discussed at note 78 supra. 
86. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125-27 (1974); United States v. Was-
serman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1974). 
87. See pt. Il B infra. 
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the prosecution's case, such as scienter, were lacking.88 
There will be many cases, however, where the record clearly 
reflects that "the [work itself] was on trial."89 In such instances, 
ample justification exists for concluding that the previously ad-
judicated materials are acceptable to the community: the com-
munity must accept what it cannot constitutionally prohibit. 
Thus, in a subsequent obscenity defense, this previously _adjudi-
cated material should be · admissible as comparison evidence 
without any further demonstration of acceptability to the com-
munity. Principles of collateral estoppel90 should bar the prose-
cution - after failing previously to prove a lack of community 
acceptance under the Miller test - from asserting that the prof-
fered comparison exhibits are not acceptable to the community. 
2. Comparison evidence widely available- The Supreme 
Court observed in Hamling that the mere availability of compar-
ison evidence does not necessarily demonstrate its acceptabil-
ity.91 Rather, availability of comparison exhibits might show 
"nothing more than that other persons are engaged in similar 
activities."92 At some point, however, a work widely available 
must be considered inferentially acceptable. "The community 
cannot, where liberty of speech and press are at issue, condemn 
that which it generally tolerates."93 Thus, in Womack, the court 
drew a distinction between comparison exhibits having "mere 
88. See United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 180 (W.D. Mich. 
1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. 
Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967). A general verdict will not necessarily speak 
to the obscenity vel non of the material in question. See, e.g., id.; Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147 (1959)(obscenity conviction reversed for lack of scienter); Walker v. State, 
530 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). 
89. Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 197, 233 A.2d 840, 845 
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968); see Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 
(1966). 
90. Issues actually litigated and necessarily decided will be binding in a subsequent 
action, through principles of collateral estoppel, upon a party to the first action which 
had the incentive and a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues. See Parklane 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of 
m. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Thus, when the state has failed in its attempt to 
prove a particular work obscene in a case not decided upon peripheral issues, collateral 
estoppel should. bar the state from subsequently reasserting that the work is obscene. 
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (applying collateral estoppel in a criminal law 
setting). See generally Hirsch & Ryan, supra note 78, at 76-81; Note, Subsequent Use of 
Civil Adjudications of Obscenity, 13 TuLsA L.J. 146 (1977). 
91. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 126 (1974); see cases cited note 27 supra. 
92. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 126 (quoting United States v. Manarite, 
448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971)); see United States v. Hoch-
man, 175 F. Supp. 881, 882 (E.D. Wis. 1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
364 U.S. 837 (1960). 
93. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 171 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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availability," and those having a "reasonable degree of commu-
nity acceptance. "H 
To presume that available, sexually explicit material is accept-
able and thus demonstrative of prevailing community standards 
presupposes community awareness of the material. On this ba-
sis, the Womack court properly rejected defendants' proffer of 
comparison exhibits purchased from suppliers in New York be-
cause the availability of these exhibits without more did not in-
dicate community acceptance in the District of Columbia. 915 Vast 
elements of the community likely will have no knowledge of ma-
terial available only outside the community; "such esoteric 
materials purchased from a few vendors known only to those in 
the trade with no general circulation are not probative on the 
issue of contemporary community standards."98 In contrast, 
comparison exhibits have been admitted into evidence, for in-
stance, when purchased nearby the federal courthouse housing 
an obscenity trial. 87 
Another argument advanced to support the acceptability of 
comparison exhibits is that sexually explicit and available mate-
rial must be accepted if it has not been subject to prosecution 
for violating obscenity statutes.98 In general, though, the lack of 
prosecution cannot be taken as an accurate barometer of com-
munity acceptance. While the initiation of proceedings against a 
particular work will tend to rebut an inference that the commu-
nity accepts the work, the converse will not necessarily be true. 
Public inertia in making complaints or the lack of prosecutorial 
resources, rather than general acceptance, may account for the 
unhindered presence of sexually explicit material in the commu-
nity. 88 The government's silence regarding a sexually oriented 
94. United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 
U.S. 1022 (1975); see Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1966), rev'd 
per curiam on other grounds, 388 U.S. 449 (1967). 
95. United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d at 380. 
96. Id.; see United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 947 (1971); United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 197 n.27 (W.D. 
Mich. 1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub 
nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 
584, 644, 512 P.2d 1049, 1083 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949 (1974). 
97. United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. 
m. 1975). 
98. See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 609 F.2d at 380; United States v. One Reel of 
35mm Color Motion Picture Film, 491 F.2d 956, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. 
West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 201 (W.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th 
Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 
447 (1967). 
99. Moreover, if the lack of criminal prosecution were deemed sufficient to establish 
the acceptability of comparison evidence, the state could face a quandary in initiating a 
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work will bear directly upon community acceptance only if the 
obscenity defendant establishes that factors other than accepta-
bility cannot explain the failure to prosecute. 
The sales records of comparison exhibits are perhaps the best 
evidence of their acceptability in the community. Sales figures 
help indicate the local perception of works which, even though 
available, are not necessarily accepted in the community. For in-
stance, Larry Flynt, during his trial for distribution of obscene 
materials, attempted to show the community acceptance of vari-
ous proffered comparison exhibits by introducing into evidence 
the distribution records for those exhibits.100 The court, in re-
jecting the proffered exhibits, noted that Flynt could have 
proven the acceptability of the comparison evidence if he had 
introduced sales figures, but that distribution figures bore solely 
upon availability.101 Even had Flynt mustered sales records for 
the comparison exhibits, however, he would have faced difficul-
ties in showing community acceptance without proving that the 
sales were distributed among a cross-section of the community. 
If purchasers of the comparison exhibits were a distinct minor-
ity, or people from outside the community, or curiosity buy-
ers,102 then even sales :figures might not establish acceptance. 
B. The Similarity of Comparison Evidence 
Determining whether a proffered comparison exhibit is similar 
to the material at issue in an obscenity trial, for purposes of the 
Womack relevancy test,1°8 raises vexing problems. The critical 
inquiry in assessing similarity will be the identification of signifi-
cant differences between the comparison evidence and the puta-
tively obscene material; " 'slight' variations in format may well 
produce vastly different consequences in obscenity determina-
tions. "10• The courts, however, have not always taken account of 
prosecution against a distributor of sexually explicit material. A vendor charged for the 
first time with distributing obscene material could proffer his wares, other than those at 
issue, as comparison exhibits and claim them to be accepted by the community. See 
State v. Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 126 N.W.2d 858 (1964} (defendant seller of sexually 
explicit works argued that items in his store not seized as obscene were acceptable and 
admissible as comparison evidence}. 
100. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. 
101. Id.; see cases cited note 27 supra. 
102. See United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1936} (refusing to permit 
introduction of list of buyers of sexually explicit works, because even respectable people 
may have a taste for salacity}. 
103. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra. 
104. United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1974}, cert. denied, 422 
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the definition of obscenity when determining questions of simi-
larity, and thus have failed to develop a consistent, logical ap-
proach tQ evaluating these "slight variations.ui011 
Comparison exhibits are introduced to show that the material 
at issue does not transgress contemporary community standards 
on obscenity. Thus, the inquiry into similarity should relate to 
the definition of obscenity; comparison evidence should be as-
sessed for its similarity to the material at issue with respect to 
the three-part Miller test.106 Comparison evidence which varies 
from the material at issue only in ways not bearing upon the 
obscenity determination should be considered similar and thus 
admissible.107 
In general, though, the courts have not articulated in this 
fashion their approach to assessing the similarity of comparison 
evidence. While there may be good reason, for instance, to find 
comparison evidence depicting "normal" heterosexual activity 
different from putatively obscene material depicting "perverse" 
activities such as sadomasochism or bestiality,1°8 dissimilarity 
has been merely asserted without reference to underlying analy-
sis under the Miller test.109 Likewise, courts have found adult 
heterosexual activity different from homosexual activity110 and 
have distinguished "skin" magazines from marriage manuals or 
medical textbooks.111 In addition to questions of subject matter, 
U.S. 1022 (1975). 
105. Compare id. at 379 (holding that pictures of young boys in various sexual activi-
ties were not similar to pictures of adult heterosexual activity, erotically posed nude and 
partially nude females, nude adult males, and young boys in nonerotic poses, nor to an 
"illustrated version" of the Report of the President's Commission on Obscenity), with 
Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir.) (allowing a comparison of the Kinsey 
Report with the material in question), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962), and Flynt v. 
State, 158 Ga. App. 232, 249-50, 264 S.E.2d 669, 675, 681 (Deen, C.J., concurring) (find-
ing comparison evidence similar to the material in question, even though, unlike the 
works at issue, the comparison exhibits did not combine heterosexual intercourse, scatol-
ogy, bestiality, morbidity and violence, interracial sex, sadomasochism, child seduction, 
lesbianism, heterosexual fellatio and cunnilingus), stay of enforcement denied, 446 U.S. 
981 (1980). 
106. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra. 
107. This assumes, of course, that the acceptability of the comparison evidence has 
been established. See pt. II A supra. 
108. See United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977) (comparison 
evidence was not similar because, unlike material at issue, it did not deal with sado-
bondage), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 293 (1978). 
109. See, e.g., Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 403-04 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd 
on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
110. See United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other 
grounds, 436· U.S. 293 (1978). 
111. See United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 191 (W.D. Mich. 
1964) (medical treatises, scientific treatises, marriage manuals, and "classics" not similar 
to allegedly obscene books), a{f'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other 
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proffered comparison evidence of a medium different from the 
work at issue frequently has been found not similar and thus 
inadmissible. Films have been distinguished from books -or 
magazines, 111 live dance from other forms of expression, 118 and 
still photographs . from classic oil paintings, magazines, or 
books. m At least one court has found comparison evidence dis-
similar to the work in question on the basis of intended audience 
and presentation, rejecting the proffer of a comparison between 
a sex education slide show and the movie Deep Throat. 1111 
In many instances, valid justifications grounded in the Miller 
test may be developed to support the distinctions drawn by the 
courts. For example, "skin" magazines or explicit photographs 
safely can be found dissimilar to classical oil paintings, marriage 
manuals, or medical textbooks on the basis of social value of the 
works. A failure to articulate such a rationale, though, may raise 
problems in close cases. Social value is a concept susceptible of 
distortion. Thus, it requires careful examination whenever the 
proffered comparison evidence differs from the material in ques-
tion on that basis - "what is pornography for one man is the 
laughter of genius to another."118 
As another example, distinctions between comparison exhibits 
and putatively obscene material based upon the age, gender, and 
activities of the participants probably reflect an emphasis upon 
similarity in terms of offensiveness and appeal to the prurient 
interest. Yet human sexual activity can take almost infinitely va-
riable forms, with different effect upon the target audience or 
grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); United States v. Gower, 
316 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 (D.D.C. 1970) (instructive manuals distinguished from pictures 
because manuals might have social value), uacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 
U.S. 914 (1973). 
112. See United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977), reu'd on other 
grounds, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); People v. Bloss, 18 Mich. App. 410, 416, 171 N.W.2d 455, 
458 (1969), reu'd on other grounds, 402 U.S. 938 (1971). 
113. See State v. Carlson, 291 Minn. 368, 373, 192 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1971)(live danc-
ing show, books, and magazines not similar to a film). But see In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 
563, 566-67, 446 P.2d 535, 538, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658 (1968) (films and magazines were 
admitted to demonstrate the acceptability of a live dance), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 
(1969). 
114. See Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365 
U.S. 859 (1961); United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich. 
1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), reu'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. 
Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); United States v. One Unbound Volume, 128 
F. Supp. 280 (D. Md. 1955)(books on archeological artifacts not similar to pictures in-
tended for display even though the pictures concerned the same artifacts). 
115. See United States v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237, 245 (6th Cir. 1981). 
116. United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 1965)(quoting D.H. LAWRENCE, 
Pornography and Obscenity, in SEX LITERATURE AND CENSORSHIP 69 (H. Moore ed. 
1953)). 
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the general public. If courts do not engage in critical reasoning, 
they run the risk of substituting visceral reactions for reasoned 
decisions when assessing whether proffered comparison exhibits 
are similar to the material at issue in terms of offensiveness or 
appeal to the prurient interest.117 
C. Requiring the Trial Court to Make Written Relevancy 
Determinations 
The foregoing discussion amply demonstrates the difficulties 
involved in establishing the relevancy of comparison evidence. 
Yet these difficulties do not justify perfunctory exclusion of 
comparison evidence; rather, they only illustrate the obstacles 
facing the defendant attempting to show the nonobscenity of 
sexually explicit materials. H the difficulty of introducing rele-
vant comparison evidence warrants its exclusioll, the obscenity 
defendant may lose his only avenue for proving prevailing com-
munity standards - and thus the only avenue for vindicating 
his constitutional rights. 
The obstacles involved in adducing relevant proof of commu-
nity standards should induce caution among courts excluding 
comparison exhibits and should encourage diligence among ap-
pellate courts reviewing such evidentiary exclusions. This goal 
can be realized only by requiring trial courts to articulate rea-
sons for adjudging comparison evidence not relevant. Appellate 
courts cannot possibly review evidentiary rulings on comparison 
evidence made by the 'trial court unless there is a clear delinea-
tion of the reasoning. If the trial court makes explicit findings, 
on appeal there can be a determination whether the rulings on 
comparison evidence were clearly erroneous, 118 and the appellant 
challenging the exclusion of comparison exhibits will have a 
more realistic opportunity to prove an abuse of discretion.119 To 
117. The approach taken in Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974), exemplifies the problems that can 
arise when the similarity of comparison exhibits is evaluated without reference to the 
underlying constitutional standards. Applying the Roth-Memoirs test, see note 7 supra, 
the court found proffered comparison evidence depicting one model dissimilar to puta-
tively obscene material showing more than one person, 470 F.2d at 403, reasoning that 
pictures of two or more models presented a greater likelihood of depicting sexual activ-
ity, id. at 401. Similarity should depend, however, not upon the likelihood of portraying 
objectionable sexual activity, but rather whether there actually is sexually explicit mate-
rial transgressing the bounds of constitutionally protected speech. 
118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 67, at§ 13.8. 
119. In Hamling, the defendants lost their evidentiary arguments on appeal because 
they had failed to prove the trial court abused its discretion. See Hamling v. United 
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enable effective appellate review of decisions to exclude compar-
ison evidence, and to m
0
aximize the protection of the obscenity 
defendant's constitutional rights to free speech and due process, 
the trial court should be required to determine in writing 
whether proffered comparison evidence was shown to be similar 
to the materials in question and acceptable to the community.120 
III. THE RISK OF CONFUSION AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR 
EXCLlJDING RELEVANT COMPARISON EVIDENCE 
As a general principle, relevant evidence may be excluded 
when its introduction would cause confusion by entangling the 
jury in collateral issues raised by the evidence.1111 In Hamling v. 
United States, 1211 the Supreme Court applied this general rule in 
endorsing the risk of jury confusion as a valid reason for exclud-
ing relevant comparison evidence in an obscenity trial.123 Of ne-
cessity, comparison evidence raises issues not involved diI'.ectly 
States, 418 U.S. 87, 125-26 (1974). 
. 120. Cf. Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.) (dam-
ages awarded by trial court without jury must be supported by factual findings so appel-
late court can review for error), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980). 
121. More precisely, relevant evidence may be excluded if it confuses or misleads the 
jury, creates unfair surprise, unfairly prejudices one party, wastes time and causes delay, 
or needlessly presents cumulative evidence. See FBI>. R. Evm. 403; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra 
note 29, at § 29a. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, at § 443(2). 
Risk of confusion is the most salient reason for excluding sexually explicit comparison 
exhibits; the other factors commonly cited to justify the exclusion of relevant evidence 
have little weight in obscenity trials. First, comparison evidence should never be ex-
cluded because of the risk of unfair surprise. The prosecution should readily anticipate a 
proffer of evidence on community standards in an obscenity trial, and to the extent that 
the prosecution needs time to address the particular evidence proffered, a continuance 
rather than exclusion of the evidence would cure the problem. Second, comparison evi-
dence should never be excluded due to the risk of prejudice. Unfair prejudice arises when 
the evidence tends to induce the jury to use an improper basis of decision. See FBo. R. 
Evm. 403, Advisory Committee Note; McCORMICK, supra note 60, § 185, at 439 & n.31. 
In contrast, comparison evidence will not encourage improper deliberations but will di-
rect the jury to decide on the basis of community standards concerning sexually explicit 
materials, even if it finds those standards loathsome. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, 
at § 1159 (arguing that jurors' sensitivities should not prevent the presentation of the 
necessary parts of a defense). Even should the jury's disgust at the comparison exhibits 
work against the defendant, the evidence should be admissible - after all, the defendant 
has introduced the evidence. Finally, because of the unique characteristics of comparison 
evidence, see notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra, it should never be considered 
cumulative with expert testimony on community standards. While the concern for avoid-
ing cumulative evidence may be a valid reason for limiting the number of comparison 
exhibits, see cases cited note 28 supra, it should not be used to exclude those exhibits 
altogether. 
122. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 
123. Id. at 127. 
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in the trial of the purveyor of sexually explicit material. Even 
though the judge has found the evide\lce admissible, the jury 
still must apply the Womack test independently, deciding 
whether the comparison evidence truly reflects community stan-
dards, and whether the comparison exhibit is comparable to the 
material at issue. 
Although comparison evidence raises more questions for the 
jury and thereby complicates the trial in one sense, it should not 
be considered a source of jury confusion. In fact, comparison evi-
dence clarifies matters for the jury by providing concrete illus-
tration of contemporary community standards with respect to 
.sexually explicit materials - standards that the jury must eval-
uate under the Miller definition of obscenity. If the jury is capa-
ble, as the Court assumes, of applying community standards to 
determine obscenity without any evidence of those standards, 
then surely the jury can assess the proper weight to be given 
comparison exhibits without becoming unduly confused;124 the 
jury commonly must assess the weight of relevant evidence. 
If, on the other hand, the jury cannot be presumed to have 
independent knowledge of community standards, as this Article 
concludes, 1211 it may not be able to assess whether comparison 
exhibits accurately reflect those standards. This presents the 
risk that the jury will rely on comparison exhibits which do not 
accurately reflect prevailing community attitudes on sexually ex-
plicit material. 
This risk should not be avoided, however, by excluding rele-
vant comparison evidence. Exclusion of such evidence maximizes 
the likelihood that the jury, having no evidence of community 
standards, will merely apply its own prejudices in making an ob-
scenity determination. The response to the jury's inability to 
fully weigh the force of comparison evidence should not be to 
cast the jury further into the dark. Although introducing com-
parison exhibits may tend to benefit the purveyor of obscene 
materials along with the person exercising a legitimate right to 
free speech, the criminal law dictates implicitly that it is prefer-
able to allow a guilty person to go free than to convict an inno-
cent person exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
The risk of inaccurate jury evaluation of comparison evidence 
should be checked through careful, diligent use of the Womack 
relevancy test. If the foundation requirements of similarity and 
acceptability have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the 
124. See Dennison, supra note 45, at 217. 
125. See pt. I A supra. 
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court, there exists little danger of improper jury reliance. In-
deed, comparison evidence found relevant under Womack likely 
does reflect prevailing community standards. The jury remains 
free to disregard the evidence, 128 and the prosecution can attack 
the probative value of the exhibits. The defendant who succeeds, 
however, in overcoming the sizable hurdles involved in demon-
strating the similarity and acceptability of comparison evidence 
should not be thwarted by the risk of jury confusion. Under this 
approach, if comparison evidence satisfies the Womack test, its 
exclusion on the basis of possible jury confusion should be con-
sidered an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the concept of community standards lies at the core 
of the definition of obscenity, a jury cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to have an accurate perception of those standards. Thus, 
proof of community standards is critical to protecting the due 
process and free speech rights of the obscenity defendant, and 
comparison evidence, as a uniquely effective way of presenting 
those standards, may be essential to an adequate defense against 
obscenity charges. 
Assessing the relevancy of comparison evidence necessitates 
troublesome determinations as to community acceptability and 
similarity between the proffered evidence and the work in ques-
tion. But the difficulty does not stem from the proffer of com-
parison evidence; such evidence merely forces the jury to repeat 
questions that must be asked about the material in question. 
Rather, confusion stems from the definition of obscenity and its 
reliance upon community standards as a dividing line between 
protected and unprotected speech. The vast difficulties involved 
in showing the relevancy of comparison evidence suggest the 
near impossibility of determining in advance whether a particu-
lar work is obscene. The purveyor of sexually explicit works who 
thus must await a case-by-case assessment of obscenity either 
suffers a chilling of potentially protected speech or risks convic-
tion under standards not easily subject to proof at trial. 
Such post-hoc determinations of obscenity hardly constitute 
adequate protection for the defendant's constitutional rights to 
126. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100 (1974) (jury was free to disregard 
expert testimony on community standards). 
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free speech and due process.127 Given the dilemma confronting 
the purveyor of sexually explicit material, relevant comparison 
evidence should be admitted even if it brings increased complex-
ity to the trial; to err on the side of inclusion is to give the de-
fendant a fighting chance. 
127. See Ford v. State, 394 N.E.2d 250, 258 {Ind. App. 1979) (Garrand, J., dissenting) 
(the standards on obscenity "create a community of the twelve seated in the box and 
permit their standards to largely determine ex post facto whether material is obscene"); 
Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Community Standards": The Perpetuation of 
an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1978). But see Com-
ment, Community Standards in Obscenity Adjudication, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (1978) 
(advocating retention of community standards concept in order to limit the power of 
trial judges and to leave obscenity determinations to the jury). 
